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A N N O U N C E M E N T

ASIAN SURVEY, which makes its first appearance with this number, is intended to serve functions not ordinarily served by the scholarly quarterlies. Its main purpose is to provide insights into current developments in Asia--to concern itself as much with the topical foreground as with the background of contemporary affairs.

Insofar as the availability of material permits, ASIAN SURVEY will present articles describing or analyzing current affairs, reporting on significant research in progress, and now and then presenting an English translation from the vernacular of an important document. Shorter notes and comment will be presented, as will occasional review articles. The usual type of book review will be dispensed with. Correspondence concerning matters inside or outside the magazine will be published when appropriate. In short, ASIAN SURVEY will attempt to meet the needs of a broad readership by presenting materials in many disciplines and concerning varied aspects of the Asian scene.

ASIAN SURVEY is open to contributors who are qualified to write interestingly and informatively about contemporary Asian affairs from the vantage points of anthropology, economics, geography, modern history, politics, sociology, literature, the creative arts, or whatever. Articles ordinarily should not exceed 2,500 words in length, should be succinct rather than discursive, and should carry a minimum of footnotes in their baggage. Shorter contributions will be equally welcome, as will reports on research in progress or in prospect, and particularly reports based on relatively prolonged research in the field.

Inquiries may be sent to the Editor. So may subscriptions, at $6. for one year (12 issues) in the United States and Canada, and at $7. elsewhere.

BEHIND THE 1960 JAPANESE DIET ELECTION

Douglas H. Mendel, Jr.

LAST YEAR MARKED the seventieth anniversary of the Japanese Diet, but the November 1960 election for the lower house climaxed the year of most violent political controversy in postwar Japan. The stormy ratification of the revised United States-Japan Security Treaty; the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi after the Haggerty incident and subsequent mass riots forced him to cancel President Eisenhower's visit; and the dramatic assassination of Socialist leader Asanuma on the eve of the fall campaign all contributed to make this by far the most significant election since 1952.

What was the total context within which the new Ikeda Cabinet and its divided opposition waged the November contest? What appeals did they employ, and how can we interpret the meaning of the results? Prime Minister Ikeda called his Liberal-Democratic success the repudiation of "Socialist neutralism," but the Shakai Shimpo (official Socialist organ) claimed a "victory for democracy, neutralism, and our anti-treaty campaign."[1] The truth, as usual in political statements, lies somewhere between these partisan claims. But let us look more closely and dispassionately at the context and significance of the 1960 election.

Certainly, the most highly-publicized issue before and during the campaign was the heated debate over ratification of the new treaty and Kishi's parliamentary tactics on May 19. Opposition to treaty revision began in 1957 and reached a crescendo of massive street demonstrations in November 1959, when Asanuma was accused of encouraging student mobs to storm the Diet gates. In January 1960, as Kishi left for the Washington ceremonial signing of the new pact, students wrecked Tokyo Airport in frustrated protest. Anti-treaty petitions, strikes, and other demonstrations against the treaty increased in size and number throughout the spring, while more moderate persons criticized the Government's failure to explain its policies more adequately. The conservatives' action of pushing the treaty through the House of Representatives' midnight session on May 19 triggered the uncontrollable riots in June

which embarrassed Japanese-American relations and forced Kishi's resignation.

We need not elaborate further on the nature and rationale of the May-June crises, so well analyzed in Edwin O. Reischauer's recent article in Foreign Affairs, and, from the Japanese opposition viewpoint, in the Far Eastern Survey last October.[2] The Diet dissolution and new election, demanded earlier by all opposition leaders and many newspapers, became inevitable shortly after the Ikeda Cabinet took power.

The use of violence by extremes of the left and right does deserve additional comment in terms of the pre-election atmosphere. Opponents of the Kishi regime used every means, however questionable, permitted under generous postwar laws. Obstructionist tactics inside the Diet and mass demonstrations in major cities, especially Tokyo, produced counter-demonstrations by ultra-rightist groups which claimed that both the Government and the general public were too lenient toward left-wing violence. Since the rightists were both numerically weaker and less united than the left, some were inclined toward acts of individual violence against Socialist leaders. An abortive stabbing of Socialist Kawakami Jotaro by an incensed rightist youth outside the Diet preceded the more spectacular televised assassination of Asanuma in Hibiya Hall. These incidents, and the less explicable attack on Kishi after his resignation, aroused fears that prewar "government by assassination" might return in a new guise.

The political climate of contemporary Japan, however, discourages the personal violence of the ultra-right far more than the mass "democratic" protests of the left. The Government, press, and public opinion strongly denounced the stabbings and helped ensure an orderly conduct of the official campaign and election. As we shall see, voters did not penalize the left Socialists at the polls for their tactics, but probably few people believed Socialist allegations that the Liberal-Democrats had given support to such rightist groups as the Dai Nippon Aikokuto and Kokumin Doshikai.[3] The Socialists, in their Diet campaigning, tried to win sympathy votes for their martyred leader and ran his widow very successfully in Tokyo.

Another important factor in the campaign was the Socialist party split of January 1960. Sorely divided along ideological and personal lines, the right and left Socialists had reunited in 1955 after four years of separation. Unresolved differences, exacerbated by right-wing criticism of the "Sakisaka

thesis" and Asanuma's statement in Peking that "American imperialism is the common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese peoples," finally drove the right-wing minority under Nishio Suehiro to secede in January 1960.[4] Nishio's Democratic-Socialists objected to the left Socialists' alleged dependence on the Sohyo labor federation; to a "class" rather than a "mass" orientation; and to a neutralism that favored the Communist bloc. Mutual recriminations between the two Socialist parties continued throughout the campaign, with the Socialist majority accusing their rivals of being merely Liberal-Democratic tools.

Finally, no one should overlook the pervasive impact of economic prosperity on the average Japanese voter in 1960. Every index of industrial production, national income, and (most important) consumer spending rose to record levels in 1958-60.[5] Conservative candidates stressed these economic issues in the gubernatorial campaigns of 1960 with notable success. Prime Minister Ikeda, famed for his promise to double the national income in ten years, promised small businessmen a Y100-million tax cut in 1961 and other economic benefits to farmers and consumers.[6] Pre-election polls and press reports showed greater popular interest in these issues than in the more publicized questions of defense or foreign policy.

THE Ikeda regime waited from July to October to call for the anticipated election. National polls of voter attitudes may have encouraged Ikeda to postpone the voters' day of decision. First, an Asahi survey in late May had revealed great hostility toward Prime Minister Kishi. Only 12 per cent favored continuation of his Cabinet, with most Liberal-Democratic voters joining in the attack, but the same sample continued to express the same 3-to-2 margin of Liberal-Democratic party preference as in previous years.[7] Polls also revealed plurality opposition to the Socialists' program of neutrality, recognition of only Communist China, and a class-oriented Socialist party. Finally, one month after Ikeda assumed control of the Liberal-Democratic regime, another Asahi poll approved his new Cabinet by a 3-to-1 margin.[8]

Japanese Diet campaigns are limited by law to about three weeks preceding election day. During this concentrated period of official campaigning, the three major parties reiterated their previous positions. Ikeda's Liberal-Democrats defended the Security Treaty in guarded language, supported continued friendship with the "free nations," and criticized neutralism

as unrealistic. But the conservatives also made strong economic appeals, and relied on Japan's first woman Cabinet minister (Mrs. Nakayama, dropped as Welfare Minister after the election) to attract female votes. Ikeda himself, assuming what the Japanese press termed a "low posture," promised to stabilize domestic politics and to avoid such controversial policies as constitutional amendment or Police Law revision. The governing party sponsored 399 candidates, but did not expect to elect many more than about 300 to the 467-member house.

Socialists stressed their neutrality theme, abrogation of the Security Treaty, diplomatic ties with Peking, and reduction of the Self-Defense Force to pay for more social security. Their opposition to veterans' pensions, however, alienated large numbers of veterans and bereaved families. Competing with the conservatives' consumer appeals, the Socialists assured each Japanese family that it would receive twice the daily quantity of milk promised by the Liberal-Democratic platform! (Bipartisan confirmation of postwar changes in the Japanese diet and of recent milk surpluses created by expanded productivity.) The Socialists endorsed 186 candidates, compared with their 122 seats before the election, but did not expect to win more than 140.

Nishio's small contingent of 40 Democratic-Socialists waged a difficult campaign, espousing middle-of-the road policies on issues from defense to automation: "Gradual abolition of the Security Treaty," "Recognition of both Chinas," and similar slogans. These hurt the party less than did its weak organization (including the Zenro labor unions, a minority of intellectuals, and scattered local supporters more loyal to individual Dietmen than to principles). The party put up 105 candidates, mostly new faces, and bravely predicted that 80 would win.

The Japan Communist party placed one candidate in each of the 118 election districts and waged a predictable campaign. Independents and smaller parties nominated 132 candidates, mostly nominal conservatives, and had even less hope of success.

Ikeda, Nishio, and Eda Saburo (Asanuma's temporary successor) conducted one television debate in mid-November, but in a closed studio after the tragedy of the pre-campaign TV debate in Hibiya Hall. Japan followed the precedent of the Nixon-Kennedy debates, but where else in the non-Western world could one have expected this? Most of the three-week

official campaign was devoted to the more traditional speech-making, posters, and party pamphleteering (canvassing being forbidden in Japanese elections, and use of mass media being severely restricted by law).

Results of the 1960 election, compared with the previous race in 1958, are shown in the table. As expected, the Liberal-Democrats won 296 seats and 58 per cent of the vote. Their gain of 13 seats over the immediate pre-election period (widely-publicized abroad) is deceptive when we make the more valid comparison with 1958 (298 seats, including 11 bandwagon "independents" who joined up immediately after the election). The party's percentage of the popular vote dropped to a post-1952 low, and Ikeda failed to elect the two-thirds necessary for constitutional amendment. Almost all major conservative politicians (including the durable Yoshida) were re-elected, however, and the party could claim to have held its own.

The combined opposition vote rose to a record 15.4 million, more than 39 per cent of the total, a record post-treaty high. The bulk of these (10.8 million votes) went to the Socialists, who gained 23 seats, mostly at the expense of their right-wing rivals. The latter suffered an ignominious defeat,

PARTY STRENGTH IN LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS, 1958-1960[a]

Party	Percentage of Vote		Seats Won[b]		(Before election)
	May 1958	November 1960	May 1958	November 1960	
Liberal-Democratic	57.8	57.6	287	296	(283)
Socialist	32.9[c]	27.6	166[c]	145	(122)
Democratic Socialist	--	8.8	--	17	(40)
Communist	2.6	2.9	1	3	(1)
Other; Independent	6.7	3.2	13	6	(2)
					(19 vacant)
Total	100.0	100.0	467	467	(467)

[a]Data from Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri, Nov. 22, 1960; and Jichisho senkyokyoku, Shugiin-giin sosenkyo kekka no gaiyo (sokuho), December (?) 1960 (latter is the earliest official statistical outline of results).

[b]Liberal-Democrats gained 11 more seats after the 1958 election and 4 after the 1960 election when independents joined their ranks (see Asahi Evening News, Dec. 26, 1960).

[c]Socialists were a united party in 1958.

falling from 40 to 17 seats and from 5.1 million votes in 1955 to only 3.5 million in 1960. Democratic-Socialist leader Nishio won easily in Osaka, birthplace of the prewar Socialist organization, but ex-Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu barely managed to earn bottom place among his district's victors.

The advance of the left-wing Socialists was probably the most remarkable election result, and portentous for the future. From 3.4 million votes (less than 10 per cent of the total) in 1952, the aggressive and well-organized party rose to 4.5 million in 1953, 5.7 million in early 1955, and 10.9 million in 1960. It attracted three times as many votes in 1960 as Nishio's rival party. In Tokyo, where Mrs. Asanuma drew second place with 107,974 votes, the party won 11 of the 27 seats allotted to the world's largest city. Socialists also ran especially well in Hokkaido, Niigata, Nagano, Kyoto, and Fukuoka prefectures, and made inroads into more traditionally conservative areas elsewhere. In fact, at least one Socialist candidate was elected in every one of the 110 districts in which the party competed (it ran no candidates in the remaining eight districts).

The Japanese Communists polled 1.1 million votes, compared with 976,000 in 1958. This was still less than 3 per cent of the popular vote. Shiga (Osaka I) was joined by comrades Kawakami Kanichi (Osaka II) and Taniguchi Zentaro (Kyoto I), but neither Shiga nor Kawakami could have won without an indirect assist from conservative factionalism in that city. The two runner-up Liberal-Democrats in each of the Osaka City districts polled a combined total of more than 100,000, or 20,000 more than either of the victorious Communists. If they had combined their strength and submerged personal rivalry (perhaps a vain hope in this case), the results might have been different. Japan's multi-member district system encourages such candidate competition, but the odds are against any early return to a single-member district system, which would also threaten some conservative Dietmen. On the other hand, the Communists would have won 14 (instead of 3) seats under a system of absolute proportional representation.

The election reduced the female membership of the lower house to 7, the smallest number in postwar history, and independents also continued their decline. In terms of age, those elected in 1960 averaged somewhat older than those elected in 1958 (42 fewer members under age 55, and a comparable increase

in those between 55 and 75). The percentage of incumbents returned to office (74) was the highest since the war.

TO what extent did these results indicate public reaction to national and international issues? Most official and press comment in the United States and Western Europe accepted the Ikeda Cabinet's glowing victory statement, while neutralist and Communist nations preferred the Socialist interpretation. If the election had been held closer to the May-June crisis, perhaps it would have served better as a referendum on neutralism. By mid-November, however, the Ikeda Cabinet had strengthened its position, as the Asahi poll indicated; the Kennedy victory in the American election suggested a more flexible Far Eastern policy; and Japanese had had more time to consider the total context. No single factor predominated at the time of the election, so basic voter preferences determined the outcome.

The election produced no major shift of strength between the governing conservatives and the combined opposition. Ikeda's retention of strength was certainly no mandate to push rearmament or foreign military commitments. After the election, Ikeda and his second Cabinet renewed pledges to seek a modus vivendi on trade with mainland China, and their draft budget for 1961-62 promised no major changes despite a 10 per cent overall increase. Awareness that 39 per cent of the voting public supported opposition candidates, and that many of their own voters disagree mildly with leadership policies, will temper the conservatives' ambitions.

But, if the election showed that Japanese neutralism was not buried as deep as Tokyo or Washington had hoped, it also confirmed Socialist fears of remaining a permanent minority. Socialists in 1960 were unable to convert the widespread popular disaffection with the Kishi regime into positive votes for themselves. "Peace and prosperity" favored the incumbents, especially when opposition parties were untried and bitterly divided.

The Democratic-Socialists' dilemma, foreshadowed by their steady decline in relation to left Socialists in past elections, was heightened in 1960. Party organs called for maximum efforts to rebuild the party and vindicate the loyalty of 3.5 million voters by better organization and programs. Will the small group of 17 right-wing Socialist Representatives (and their 16 colleagues in the House of Councillors) be tempted to rejoin the Socialists or defect to the Liberal-Democratic

camp? The latter course is most unlikely, despite their rivals' charges, and the former would involve humiliating surrender both ideologically and personally. For better or worse, there seems no place in contemporary Japan for an effective third party. Liberal-Democratic maverick Kono Ichiro must have pondered this before deciding not to bolt his party in 1960. Voter preference for the left Socialists may spur party reunification, but factionalism will continue to plague both conservatives and Socialists in the future.

The fact that the voter turnout in November 1960 was the lowest since 1947 (only 73.5 per cent) was attributed partly to the distraction of beautiful Sunday weather, but it certainly showed no fever pitch of voter interest. Rural prefectures again topped the national participation ratings (Shimane with 87 per cent), while the six major cities (where most of the earlier demonstrations had occurred) again failed to turn out more than from 56 to 62 per cent of their eligible voters. Many Japanese surveys have indicated that the people most prone to engage in direct action are the least likely to vote even if qualified. Does this bear on the suspicious attitude of many anti-Government Japanese toward elections, parliamentary discipline, and "majority rule"?

"Tyranny of the majority" may sound strange to Americans, British, and others blessed with a party system and cultural heritage of moderate compromise, although not to American racial segregationists. When Japanese Socialists use the term to justify their Diet obstructionism and street violence, they refer less to the conservatives' majoritarian pressure inside the Diet (or outright bribery of voters) than to the wide Liberal-Democratic appeal outside metropolitan areas. The strong personal and material links between conservative politicians and rural Japan, forged long before World War II, still constitute a powerful advantage for the governing party. Local and rural prefectural government is overwhelmingly conservative, as are rural organizations; the rural half of Japan votes more heavily than the big cities, and places more weight on personality than on issues; rural areas are heavily dependent upon financial subsidies from the conservative Tokyo central government. With these advantages, claim many Socialists, Liberal-Democrats can always win a general election and avoid a showdown referendum on specific issues. Such critics also tend to despair of educating Japanese farmers and small-towners to vote their "true interests."

Perhaps this cynicism, plus the Nishio party split, helps to explain the extra-parliamentary outbursts of 1960. Many left Socialists and all Communists must have discounted the election in advance as bound to produce another "artificial majority" for the governing élite.

In his Foreign Affairs article, Reischauer contended that the Japanese conservatives hold the short-run advantage, but that the Socialists may benefit from long-run demographic and cultural trends.[9] Practicing politicians are usually concerned just with the short-run, however, and the 1960 Japanese Diet election results confirmed that part of Reischauer's prediction. Moreover, Japanese conservatives as a group have demonstrated a remarkable resiliency in overcoming the many challenges to their position during and since the Occupation. Given a favorable climate of international trade, sympathetic American policies, and stronger appeals to Japanese youth and women, they may be invincible for another decade. Perhaps it would be healthier for Japanese democracy if they were challenged by a more responsible and effective opposition, as in Britain or West Germany. This is the longer-run challenge to Japanese socialism.

NOTES

1. For Ikeda's victory statements, see New York Times, November 22, 1960, and Los Angeles Times of the same date. Socialist claims are from the Shakai Shimpo, November 27, 1960.

2. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Our Broken Dialogue with Japan," Foreign Affairs, October 1960, pp. 11-26; "Japanese Intellectuals Discuss Japanese-American Relations," Far Eastern Survey, October 1960, pp. 145-60.

3. The Aikokuto and its founder, Akao Bin, were most active in staging counter-demonstrations against such leftist movements as the Anti-A and H-Bomb Congress (Hiroshima, 1959) and anti-treaty riots in Tokyo, 1960. Akao was detained briefly in connection with Asanuma's assassination, as the 17-year old assassin had been a member of the Aikokuto. Akao claims his party has no outside affiliations among the 200 rightist groups and little money to combat communism (interview with the writer, fall 1957, and written interview, January 1961). The Kokumin Doshikai, with branches in Osaka and Tokyo, publishes the thrice-monthly journal Shin Nippon (New Japan); see

especially the November 15, 1960, issue for comments on the election and Asanuma's assassination.

4. For analysis of the schism, see Robert A. Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," Foreign Affairs, January 1960, pp. 318-26.

5. For details, see Japan, Economic Planning Agency, Japanese Economic Statistics (monthly). GNP rose more than 15% in 1959-60, far above prewar levels on a per-capita basis.

6. Mainichi Daily News (monthly international edition), November 1, 1960, p. 1.

7. Asahi Evening News, June 3, 1960.

8. Asahi (Japanese), August 8, 1960, and Mainichi, August 13, 1960. About 60 percent of both samples demanded an immediate election, but 51 percent of the Asahi sample and 40 percent of the Mainichi sample said they would vote conservative. Hatoyama, Ishibashi and Kishi drew less popular support on their accession to power, according to comparative Asahi data.

9. Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

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GENERAL NASUTION'S MISSION TO MOSCOW

Guy J. Pauker

PRESIDENT SUKARNO'S impending visit to Washington may offer an opportunity to check what appears to be an alarming trend in Indonesia's world orientation. While the West was preoccupied with Cuba, Laos and the Congo, the Soviet Union has been quietly setting the stage for a major political victory in Indonesia. Despite a slow start in achieving influence in Djakarta, the Soviet Union has exploited with tenacity and realism Indonesia's frustrations concerning the achievement of major national goals and has been betting heavily, of late, on the possibility of a rapprochement.

Indonesia's past reluctance to move in that direction is easily demonstrable. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, strongly opposed by Indonesia's Moslem parties, were not established till 1954. Sukarno visited the Soviet Union only after his first trip to the United States in 1956, during which he failed to obtain support for his endeavor to achieve control over Western New Guinea. A Soviet credit of $100 million offered to Indonesia in September 1956 was not immediately accepted by the Indonesian Parliament. In 1958 the government in Djakarta, which had pleaded the previous year for American arms under suitable credit arrangements, turned to the Communist bloc and promptly received military aid, including jet fighters and submarines, for an undisclosed amount, probably in the neighborhood of $200 million. When, in February 1960, Premier Khrushchev visited Indonesia, another credit agreement for economic aid totalling $250 million was announced. There were rumors in Djakarta at that time that the Soviet Union had also offered Indonesia substantial additional amounts of military aid, but that the predominantly anti-communist Armed Forces opposed the transaction.

Less than a year later, in January 1961, a mission headed by the Minister for National Security and Chief of Staff of the Army, General A. H. Nasution, did visit Moscow and concluded an arms deal, conservatively estimated as amounting to $400 million.

Adding smaller transactions with the Soviet Union and Communist bloc countries, not included in the figures mentioned

above, more than $1 billion in economic and military credits have been offered to Indonesia since Sukarno's first visit to Moscow in 1956. This represents a Soviet aid program second only to the economic and military credits given to Communist China, which from 1950 to 1957 totalled $2.4 billion. Since then, Communist China has apparently received no Soviet credits.

At the 21st Party Congress, in January 1959, Khrushchev had said: "We do not engage in charity. The Soviet Union gives help on a fair commercial basis."[1] If Soviet motivations are not philanthropic, they are even less likely--in this case--to be commercial. Surely the Soviet government cannot expect prompt repayment of $1 billion from an Indonesian government facing the problem of finding some additional $5 billion over the next eight years for economic development.[2] The only obvious way Indonesia could repay Soviet loans would be in oil, of which the Soviet Union is already an exporter. By 1965--with production increased from 2,590,000 barrels in 1959 to 4,800,000 barrels daily--the Soviet Union is expected by American experts to have an exportable surplus on the order of one million barrels daily.[3] The Soviet Union can hardly be interested in Indonesian oil. As for other exportable products, Indonesia may at best hope to meet current expenses from the proceeds of tin, rubber and copra, but not, in the foreseeable future, to use them for the repayment of major foreign loans.

The purpose of Soviet credits to Indonesia can only be political. If Soviet aid were on a smaller scale, it would be reasonable to assume that the purpose may be primarily to balance off Western influences and strengthen Indonesian neutralism. But, if this were the only Soviet objective, the order of magnitude of Soviet aid seems disproportionately large. It seems more plausible to assume that the Soviet Union is preparing a major political "coup," by trying to win over the last significant anti-communist factor in Indonesia, namely the Armed Forces.

TO students of Soviet politics it is clear that General Nasution's mission to Moscow received all the attention and courtesy that the Soviet government extends. Premier Khrushchev and many other Soviet dignitaries attended a number of functions in honor of the delegation. Significant statements were made on these occasions and received full publicity in the Soviet press. To single out the most important instance, on January 6 the Soviet government gave a reception in honor

of the Indonesian delegation. Khrushchev was present, as well as ministers, marshals, generals, other officers, scientists, cultural workers, foreign diplomats and journalists. Members of the Soviet Army's Red Banner Song and Dance Ensemble performed at the reception.

Mikoyan made a speech, published in Pravda of January 7, 1961, which must be quoted here at some length. After stressing "the rapidly growing friendship" between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, Mikoyan, who seems to have headed the Soviet delegation negotiating with the Indonesians, said:

> We are principled enemies of colonialism. The great Lenin advised us to support in every way the struggle of the people of colonial countries for their freedom and independence, and we fulfill this sacred command of Lenin's. We quite understand the concern of the Indonesian people over the fact that colonialists still hold West Irian under their sway and we understand the Indonesian people's determination to eliminate this sore from the body of freedom-loving and independent Indonesia.
>
> The colonialists are resorting to any means to keep under their greedy paws the remnants of the colonies that have not yet liberated themselves. All progressive mankind is indignant over the breach of trust which the colonialists showed and continue to demonstrate, particularly as concerns West Irian.
>
> Only 10 years ago the Netherlands, recognizing the sovereignty of Indonesia over the entire former Dutch East Indies, announced that it would keep West Irian occupied for only one year. In fact, however, the Netherlands not only remained in this part of Indonesian territory, but in 1952 incorporated it perfidiously and against the will of the peoples into the kingdom of the Netherlands.

[At this point Khrushchev interrupted the speaker--Ed.]

> "The time will soon come to exclude it."

[Mikoyan then continued--Ed.]

> The colonialists believe that they will succeed in maintaining their domination over an inalienable part of Indonesian soil whose territory is 12 times greater than that of the Netherlands and which is situated thousands of miles away from it. That is what they in the West, in the so-called "free world," are trying to present as justice. But the common people simply call it robbery.

2

The Netherlands is sending its troops to West Irian and dispatching its navy to this area. Only recently the Dutch Government decided in a demonstrative manner to increase the funds allocated for the maintenance of the troops occupying West Irian. The Dutch troops are committing outrages against the peaceful inhabitants of West Irian.

The whole world knows that all this is not done without the approval and sanction of the NATO bloc, which became a headquarters for the struggle to preserve the remnants of colonialism and carry out a policy of neocolonialism in defiance of the unbending will of the peoples.

The Soviet people, as did all peace-loving peoples of the world, indignantly observed how two to three years ago the imperialists and colonialists tried to arrange in Indonesia something like the current events in Laos. The contemporary colonialists did not want to put up with the fact that Indonesia had firmly embarked upon the road of independence, and tried by all kinds of provocations, even to letting planes fly over its territory and giving support to the rebels, to break up the unity of the Indonesian peoples. The Indonesian peoples, however, found in themselves the strength and means to suppress the rebellion and to emerge from this test even more strong and united.

The imperialists will not succeed in turning history back. The aggressive blocs of NATO and SEATO will not help them here. NATO, which is nominally, a European-American bloc, is extending its tentacles into southeast Asia and everywhere where the colonial powers who are NATO members have their interests.

In his reply to Mikoyan's speech, Nasution stated that "an agreement highly satisfactory to both sides was reached precisely as scheduled."

The communiqué issued in Moscow on January 6, 1961, gives the following information about the purpose of Nasution's visit:

> The mission had been sent to the Soviet Union by the Government of Indonesia in accordance with measures taken to build up the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia, mainly in connection with the special situation which has arisen as a result of the tension increasing of late on the question of West Irian.

It was also stated in the communiqué that "the government of the Soviet Union met the requests of Nasution's mission concerning the purchase of new items urgently needed by the armed forces of Indonesia."

As mentioned above, at the time of Khrushchev's visit to Indonesia in February 1960 it was rumored in Djakarta that the Soviet Union had offered Indonesia large amounts of military aid, including a cruiser and other naval equipment, but that the Indonesian Armed Forces were reluctant to accept it. When, ten months later, an Indonesian delegation went to Moscow to accept the offer, it was, significantly, headed by the supposedly anti-communist Minister of National Security and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Nasution. Five days in Moscow, including two receptions attended by Khrushchev, seem to have brought about a sea-change. Before leaving Moscow, Nasution said at the airport: "We Indonesians met real friends in Russia."

It could be argued that Nasution's cordiality was due to his satisfaction that he had been able to purchase weapons for the Indonesian armed forces, on credit. But, although not on the same scale, Indonesia has acquired military materials on credit before without any comparable expression of gratitude on the part of the Army.

The most plausible explanation of Nasution's behavior seems to be that the Soviet Union has not only given Indonesia substantial amounts of military aid but has also promised to support it in the case of an Indonesian attack on the Dutch in West Irian. Khrushchev's interjected remark at the party given for the Indonesian delegation may mean that the Soviet Union was informed by Nasution that Soviet aid will be used to try to conquer West Irian, and gave its approval. The Moscow communiqué of January 6 stated:

> The Soviet people and government are profoundly sympathetic to the efforts of the people and government of Indonesia for strengthening their national independence. The Soviet government supports the just demand of the Indonesian people for the reunification of West Irian--a part of its original territory--with the Republic of Indonesia.

On January 9, 1961, Pravda, in an article devoted to Soviet-Indonesian relations, carried on the theme of the preceding days:

> The Soviet Union was the first in the international arena to come forward in defense of Indonesia's independence and demand that the colonial war in Indonesia be stopped. Our sympathies are with the Indonesian people now, too, when they are struggling for the elimination of the economic consequences of colonialism to build a new, happy life, and for the liberation of West Irian and its unification with the homeland.

HAVE the Soviets found it possible to turn General Nasution from an opponent of communism into a friend by an agreement under which, in case of use of their war materials against the Dutch, Indonesia will be protected from international complications by Soviet diplomacy? Using surplus war materials and its diplomatic capability, the Soviet Union through such a gambit could gain several advantages besides General Nasution's friendship:

1. In case of an Indonesian attack on the Dutch in West Irian, if the United States supports the Dutch, this will add weight among anti-colonialists to the statement of the 81 Communist Parties issued on December 6, 1960, in Moscow:

> International developments in recent years have furnished many new proofs of the fact that United States imperialism is the chief bulwark of world reaction and an international gendarme, that it has become an enemy of the peoples of the whole world.[4]

2. If the United States does not support the Dutch, in a case involving the use of force against them, this can only reinforce the doubts of those in NATO and SEATO who question the determination of the United States to protect its allies in case of need--despite the fact that events in the South Pacific are not covered by obligations under NATO and the Netherlands is not a member of SEATO.

3. As, at the Bandung Conference of April 1955 and ever since, even pro-Western countries of Asia and Africa have supported Indonesia's claim to West Irian, active Soviet support can only contribute to the strengthening of ties, in the United Nations and elsewhere, between the anti-colonialists and the Communist bloc, aligned, once more, against the West.

4. An Indonesian Army engaged in armed struggle against the Dutch is not likely to move against the Communist Party of Indonesia while using Soviet weapons and getting Soviet diplomatic support. Quite to the contrary, such a development may bring about the cordial cooperation between Army and Communist Party which Sukarno has been hoping for in recent years.

5. Burdened by a heavy military debt to the Soviet Union and isolated from the West by the hostility which action against West Irian is bound to arouse, the Indonesian government will not be able to implement its badly overdue economic development program either with Western help or by autarkic measures and will be forced into a much more intimate partnership with the Soviet Union than it has been prepared to accept until now. Thus the transition from "Indonesian socialism" to

Soviet communism could take place, in line with Khrushchev's thesis presented in February 1956, not through civil war but by other methods, specifically a subtle and mature Soviet foreign policy.

6. Finally, looking into the more distant future, a Communist Indonesia, militarily strong and politically close to the Soviet Union, may be a desirable partner when Communist China will have achieved sufficient military and industrial strength really to hold its own against Moscow.

TO return from the primarily speculative to the more tangible, the impression that the arms deal concluded on January 6, 1961, in Moscow is in preparation for Indonesian action against the Dutch in West Irian is strengthened by the flow of news from Djakarta:

In Makassar, the Celebes, on January 5, 1961, Lt. Colonel Djuhartono, Deputy Secretary General of the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, addressed the conference of "West Irian Volunteers" and cited a statement of Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio that "one day Indonesian forces will meet the Dutch on the same island."

On the same day, Brig. General A. Jani, Deputy Chief of Staff for East Indonesia, was quoted as having said in Ambon a few days earlier that "as long as West Irian is not restored to the fold of the Republic of Indonesia, anything could happen," adding that "colonialism and imperialism in all their manifestations will certainly be wiped out from the face of this globe."

On the same day, the Indonesian news agency Antara released a statement made by General Nasution on December 31, 1960, in Rome, on his way to Moscow: "We hope that Australia will refrain from military interference in any military clash between Indonesia and the Dutch in West Irian, if such might happen."[5]

These statements seemed synchronized to appear in the Indonesian press at the time of the announcement from Moscow concerning the arms deal. On the same day, in Surabaya, President Sukarno spoke at a naval ceremony. After expressing "Indonesia's determination to carry on her struggle to recover West Irian from Dutch colonial control," he explained that the purpose of the arms mission to Moscow was to acquire up-to-date equipment, which was "particularly necessary to face the Dutch in West Irian." He added bitterly that those who resented the fact that Indonesia had purchased arms from Moscow

"had no objections to letting the Dutch have their way in utilizing NATO armed power in the interests of imperialism in West Irian."[6]

On January 17, General Nasution was back in Djakarta. His first statement was that the Soviet arms would arrive in Indonesia "within the shortest possible time." Elaborating on the deal with the Soviet Union, Nasution said that it provided for a guaranteed supply of spare-parts and for training in the use of the acquired equipment and arms. He remarked that it had been difficult or impossible for Indonesia to buy more modern or heavier equipment from "Western bloc" countries, "because these Western countries were allied to Dutch colonialists," while commercially the terms offered by West European countries were "not so favorable." He added that "the terms of payment just agreed on in Moscow were lighter than those of earlier arms deals with the Soviet Union."[7]

Speaking about the Netherlands' policy concerning West Irian, Nasution said that "it was evident that they want to settle the issue through military force and to provoke a military clash." The most reasonable interpretation of this statement would be that if the Dutch continue to occupy West Irian, the Indonesians will expel them by force; for the alternative—namely, that the Dutch plan to attack Indonesia from West Irian—is too absurd to be stated by a military man as competent as General Nasution.

Indonesia's intentions were also suggested on January 16 at a ceremony at the Palace in Djakarta when the governor of the Moluccas, the province closest to West Irian, spoke about General Nasution's mission to Moscow. In the presence of President Sukarno, Governor Mohammed Padang said that the people of East Indonesia expect the government "to speed up the build-up of strength of the people and of the Armed Forces to kick out imperialism and colonialism from Indonesian soil."[8] Indonesians, of course, consider West Irian to be Indonesian soil occupied by the Dutch.

If the Indonesian armed forces move against West Irian and the Dutch bring the issue before the United Nations, will the Soviets treat it as an Indonesian domestic affair or as a "national liberation war"? As to the latter, Khrushchev stated on January 6, 1961, in his report on the conference of 81 Communist parties:

> What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one. These uprisings must not be identified with wars among states, with local wars, since in these

> uprisings the people are fighting for implementation of their right for self-determination, for independent social and national development. These are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes, against the colonizers. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles.[9]

With the doctrine of "national liberation war" as "just war," Khrushchev may have found the formula by which to erode the anti-communism of the Indonesian officer corps.

IT seems that for General Nasution alea jacta est. It may take some time before it becomes fully apparent that he no longer opposes full communist participation in the government of Indonesia, but the portents are unmistakable: the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, created by Nasution in January 1958 primarily as an anti-communist instrument, has ceased to exist, by Sukarno's decree, as of January 31, 1961. Although not very successful, this body was used by the Army to control communist manipulation of youth, workers, farmers, religious leaders, veterans and other organizations, through Cooperation Bodies established since July 1957.[10]

Replacing the Army-sponsored National Front, an organizationally distinct new National Front is expected to start functioning in March 1961, with Sukarno as chairman and an executive board including both Nasution and the Communist Party leader D. N. Aidit. Instead of opposing the Communist Party, the Army is now politically associated with it. No wonder that on January 31 Aidit declared that "national unity was already achieved in Indonesia." Speaking at the celebration marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist daily newspaper Harian Rakjat, the General Chairman of the Communist Party of Indonesia made the politically very important statement that "the paramount problem in Indonesian political life now is no longer how to marshal national unity, but how to consolidate, widen and strengthen it."[11]

Does this mean that an alliance between the Communist Party and the Army has been consummated? The evidence is ambiguous. On February 2 the military authorities in Djakarta suspended the Harian Rakjat for publishing Aidit's speech, the reason given being that it demanded a change in the composition of the cabinet, which at present does not include members of the Communist Party.[12]

President Kennedy's initiative may occasion important new developments in a fluid situation. In announcing the invitation to Washington, which had been preceded by an invitation to

Moscow, the Indonesian Foreign Office stated that President Sukarno had accepted "with pleasure." The New York Times correspondent in Djakarta, Bernard Kalb, reports that the Communist Party is presumed to be unhappy with the invitation to Washington, and notes that "President Sukarno's visit to Washington is expected to lead to a discussion of Netherlands New Guinea."[13] The time-bomb palmed off on General Nasution in Moscow may have turned into an alarm clock.

NOTES

1. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 11, No. 4, March 4, 1959, p. 22.

2. On January 1, 1961, President Sukarno inaugurated a new eight-year plan for which Rp. 240 billion, or about $5.3 billion at the official rate of exchange, will be needed. Where Indonesia expects to find $660 million annually for investment has not been disclosed.

3. Nate White, "Flood Tide of Red Oil," Christian Science Monitor, January 27, 1961.

4. New York Times, December 7, 1960, p. 14:3.

5. Antara, Djakarta, January 5, 1961 (No. 5/B), January 6, 1961 (No. 6/A and No. 6/B).

6. Antara, Djakarta, January 6, 1961 (No. 6/B).

7. Antara, Djakarta, January 17, 1961 (No. 17/A).

8. Antara, Djakarta, January 17, 1961 (No. 17/B).

9. Kommunist, Moscow, No. 1, 1961.

10. See the present writer's "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, September 1958, p. 141.

11. Antara, Djakarta, February 1, 1961 (No. 32/A).

12. Ibid., February 3, 1961 (No. 34/A).

13. New York Times, February 24, 1961, p. 2:3.

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PHANTOM FOOD IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Reed J. Irvine

"NEW CHINA'S VICTORY over the eternal plague of hunger is as startling an event as the conquest of interplanetary space." So wrote Dr. Josue de Castro, former president of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, in the fall of 1959. Dr. de Castro's extravagant admiration for communist Chinese accomplishments in the agricultural field was based on the assumptions that the production of food crops had been almost doubled from 1950 to 1957 and had been doubled again in the single year 1958, the year of the "great leap forward." There is no evidence that the Chinese communists asserted that food output had increased by more than half between 1950 and 1957, but they did at one time claim to have doubled output in the single year 1958, when production was said to have risen from 185 million tons to 375 million tons.

The startling claim that output had doubled in 1958 was radically amended in August 1959, when it was officially admitted that production in the previous year had not exceeded 250 million tons. There is reason to believe that even the revised figure considerably overstated actual production. In the first place, it is highly doubtful that Chinese officials themselves have a clear idea of what production really amounted to in 1958. The gross overestimation of the 1958 crop was not a deliberate propaganda stunt on the part of the regime. The Government was clearly misled by imaginative statistics supplied from below. It would not have deliberately exaggerated production to the degree that it did, since it would have known that a fabrication of this magnitude would soon be exposed. This supposition is supported by subsequent statements and by actions directed at the reform and improvement of statistical work in agriculture.

It is impossible for anyone, even the Chinese, to say with assurance what actual food production came to in 1958. The

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This Note embodies the personal views of the author and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the opinions of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

revision of the distorted grain statistics was officially stated to have been based on studies made in the first half of 1959, by which time much of the grain had already been consumed. It would have been physically impossible to arrive at a reliable estimate of production under these conditions, and the Government's revised figures may be assumed to represent a strongly biased guess. The bias is presumed since it would be the Government's desire to save as much face as possible. To admit an error of 125 million tons was doubtless painful enough, and it would be natural for the Government to lean in the direction of minimizing the correction.

Chang Nai-ch'i, a member of the Chinese Communist Party National Committee, in a speech in the spring of 1960 clearly hinted that the claim of a 35 per cent gain in food production in 1958 was out of line with reality. He stated,

> Compared with industry, agricultural production is restricted by more difficult conditions for a leap forward. Expansion of the cultivated land is limited and natural disasters cannot be completely avoided as yet. In addition, mechanization of agriculture and supply of chemical fertilizers are not enough. For this reason, we cannot mechanically expect agricultural production to leap forward at the same rate as industrial production; "even an annual increase of 10-12 per cent in production may be regarded as a leap forward"--this was pointed out by Premier Chou in his "Report on Government Work" last year. His words gave a pointer to the necessity for revising the statistical figures of agriculture for 1958 and at the same time outlined the scope for readjusting the targets of agricultural production for 1959 and for arranging the plans of agricultural production this year.[1]

It is clear that what Chang was suggesting here was that a realistic estimate of the increase in grain production in 1958 would have been in the vicinity of a 10 to 12 per cent gain over 1957. A 12 per cent increase would have put the total for 1958 at about 208 million tons. Such was the interpretation placed on his remarks by some of his colleagues, who subsequently took him to task severely for openly questioning the revised official figures.

Further confirmation of the belief that the revised official figures had overstated 1958 production was provided by Dr. Arao Itano, a Japanese agricultural bacteriologist who was repatriated from China early in 1960. Dr. Itano had spent the previous 20 years in China and had been working on technical agricultural problems at the Academia Sinica in Peking since

1957. He is of the opinion that the increase in the rate of food production in China has exceeded the rate of population increase but not by very much. He states that 1957 was a bad year for agriculture, 1958 a considerably better year, and 1959 another bad year.

Evidence that Dr. Itano is correct in saying that Chinese food production has not increased much faster than population, which grows about two per cent a year, is found in the serious food shortages that have appeared in 1959 and 1960. As early as the spring of 1959, stories of serious food shortages began filtering out of China. New restrictions were placed on the distribution of flour and cabbage, and many supplementary foods became difficult to obtain. The monthly rations of basic foods were reported to be 60 pounds for men and 40 pounds for women engaged in heavy work, and 32 pounds for men and women engaged in intellectual occupations. The percentage of wheat flour in the basic ration was cut to the lowest level since the beginning of rationing in 1954.[2]

An even more austere food program was initiated in July 1959, and extremely tight controls were exercised over grain consumption. Emphasis was placed on switching consumption from wheat and rice to tubers and coarser grains. It was clearly recognized in mid-year that a very serious mistake had been made in reducing the grain acreage by 11 per cent and in diverting more land to the production of fiber and oilseed crops. These steps had apparently been taken in the belief that the 1958 production statistics were realistic and that a tremendous break-through had been achieved on the food front. When the Government belatedly realized that it had been deceived by its own statistics, it made desperate efforts to stave off a food crisis by imposing austerity and encouraging a great effort to grow vegetables. By then it was, of course, too late to plant more grain. Despite the evidence of food shortages in 1959, the regime boldly announced that food output had risen eight per cent over the revised 1958 figure, to a total of 270 million tons.

The claim that output in 1959 exceeded the 1957 total by more than 45 per cent is simply not credible in view of the admitted shortages. Had food production done no more than keep abreast of population growth, 194 million tons would have sufficed to prevent a deterioration. There was no great increase in net exports of food grains, so that exports do not help explain the appearance of shortages in the face of a supposed tremendous rise in output. The Chinese account for this

paradox in terms of a rise in consumption standards, but this explanation does not seem to be borne out by reports of short rations and refugee accounts of consumption patterns.

Probably the best explanation is that the official revised food production figures for 1958 overstated output by 40 to 50 million tons and that the 1959 figure was inflated by 70 to 80 million tons. This would put production in 1959 at between 190 and 200 million tons rather than at the 270 million tons officially claimed.

Statistical exaggeration on such a large scale could not be persisted in indefinitely without producing problems. The contrast between the rosy official production figures and the shortage of food for consumption became increasingly apparent. The regime was placed in an embarrassing situation, and the ways in which it could extricate itself were limited. It could have admitted that the first correction of the statistics relating to the 1958 crop had not gone far enough. This would have been highly embarrassing, especially since the 1959 statistics would also have had to be scaled down. Any remaining confidence in the regime's statistics would have been dealt a heavy blow by such an admission. A second possibility would have been to understate all future increases in agricultural production until claims and reality could again be made to match. Unless spectacular gains could be made in agriculture, this would take a long time: if output could be raised five per cent annually, it would take at least six years to bring the total up to the figure claimed for 1959. A third solution would have been to report a disastrous crop failure attributable to natural causes. This would permit a readjustment of the official statistics to realistic levels without loss of face.

The regime has now announced that, as a result of the worst combination of natural calamities in a century, agricultural production suffered an overwhelming set-back in 1960. According to Chou En-lai, the year's production of staple foods fell somewhere between the 185 million tons produced in 1957 and the 250 million tons claimed for 1958.

While Chou's November statement was not the first mention of floods and drought during the year, nothing had been said earlier to convey the impression that the country had been struck by disasters of such catastrophic proportions. In the early fall it was claimed that the summer crop had been ten per cent larger than in the previous year. Natural disasters were cited to explain why the increase had not been larger in

view of the 20 per cent increase in acreage. At one stage, statements were being made that it would be a great victory for communist agriculture if the 1960 crop were no larger, or even a little smaller, than that of 1959. This suggests that the decision to revert to realistic production statistics via the crop-failure route came late in the fall, probably after it had become apparent that the herculean efforts made to increase production were not going to produce miracles.

Throughout the summer and fall a tremendous effort was made to stimulate agricultural production. A sense of crisis was created by repeated references in the press to floods and drought, by occasional mention of famine, and by the campaign to increase the growing of vegetables and to divert labor from the cities to the farms on a large scale. Jen-min Jih-pao stated on August 25, 1960, that millions of people from all trades and professions had undertaken to aid agriculture, and the New China News Agency reported on September 28, 1960, that two to three million cadres were working with the peasants to increase agricultural production.

These cold statististics reveal nothing of the cost in human suffering caused by the great reshuffling of labor. There is little pretense that this movement is voluntary. Two young refugees who fled China by swimming to Macau in September 1960 revealed that they had taken this desperate course after hearing of a plan to transfer to farm work 30 per cent of the cadres and apprentice workers in the shipyard where they worked.[3] Some of the discussions in the Chinese press display a cold-blooded attitude, and refer to the workers subjected to transfer as if they were horseflesh or inanimate machines, as in the following example from Jen-min Jih-pao of September 9, 1960.

> Shihping hsien, Yunnan, has resolutely transferred strong laborers to agricultural production jobs. . . . The hsien has not only taken quick action in the transfer of laborers but also paid attention to quality. At first, some units were reluctant to transfer their strong laborers to the agricultural front. Thereupon the CCP Shihping hsien committee carried out political and ideological work to drive home among the masses the idea of promoting vigorously agriculture and grain production. In addition, it formulated concrete regulations underlining the necessity of transferring more young and strong laborers to the agricultural front. Owing to the serious attitude of the party hsien committee, the laborers transferred are of a comparatively good quality. . . . Of the 4,967 persons transferred back

to the production teams, men make up 63.5 per cent, and women 36.5 per cent; 92.2 per cent have full labor power, 6.3 per cent half labor power, and 1.45 per cent auxiliary labor power. An investigation shows they have basically met the needs on the agricultural front.[4]

The official line now is that agriculture is the foundation for national economic development and that the mobilization of the whole Party and all of the people to promote agricultural, and especially grain, production is going to be necessary for some time to come. There is much greater emphasis than formerly on the need to invest more in agriculture. This does not mean that agriculture has clearly won out in the struggle for priority, but rather that the uncomfortable food situation of the past two years, which could not be concealed by exaggerated statistics, has tipped the scales a bit in favor of agriculture. Obviously the victory over hunger in communist China is still a long way off. Mr. de Castro's glorious vision was naught but a mirage.

NOTES

1. Jen-min Jih-pao, April 16, 1960, translated in Current Background, No. 628, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, July 22, 1960. (Emphasis supplied.)

2. "China's Food Problem," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 12, 1959, p. 355.

3. Hong Kong Shih Pao, September 17, 1960, translated in Review of Hong Kong Chinese Press, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, September 17-18, 1960.

4. Jen-min Jih-pao, September 9, 1960, translated in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 2342, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, September 21, 1960.

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THE FUTURE OF INDIAN CITIES

Roy Turner

DESPITE THE FACT that India has engaged in far-sighted economic planning since Independence, and despite the considerable success of the Five Year Plans, remarkably little constructive attention has been paid to the spatial aspects of social and economic change. For this reason, solid information relating to questions of population and industrial distribution is sadly lacking, and it seems likely that the lack will remain unless some thorough-going and sophisticated thinking goes into the conceptualization of this problem area. The purpose of the Berkeley Seminar, therefore, was not to provide blueprints for development, but rather to move towards some consensus regarding the nature of the processes at work and the probable outcome of present trends.

There is no difficulty in securing agreement that the social and physical conditions of Indian cities today are bad, from almost any standpoint, and that they are deteriorating. Many Indian urban dwellers are without employment, many more are literally homeless (they sleep on the streets)--and yet, year by year, each of the major cities becomes measurably larger,[1] and the relative size of the rural population falls a

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In June and July 1960, a Seminar on Urbanization in India was held in Berkeley, sponsored by the University of California and assisted by the Ford Foundation. Scholars, experts and officials, both Indian and American, presented and discussed papers on a variety of topics relating to the social and economic problems which arise, in India, out of the processes of urbanization. The present author, who is currently editing the proceedings of the Seminar for publication, here discusses one or two key topics that relate to urban problems, with reference to the treatment these matters received at the hands of the Seminar participants. Present plans call for the publication of the proceedings later this year, tentatively under the title India's Urban Future. Unless otherwise stated, the references in this article are to the projected chapters of this volume.

little more. Natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) does not alone account for this situation; by far the greatest proportion of the growth of city populations comes from the migration of villagers.[2] Edward Echeverria, consultant to the team of experts working on the Delhi Regional Plan, demonstrated that the housing deficit, far from being reduced in the decade 1951-61, has probably increased by at least three million,[3] while Clinard and Chatterjee, consultant and director respectively of the Delhi Urban Community Development Program, described the dirt, dilapidation and lack of social cohesion that characterize the poorer residential quarters of the typical Indian city.[4] P. R. Nayak, Commissioner for Delhi, agreed that Indian municipalities today confront appalling physical and social conditions, and spoke of the inadequacy of the resources of local governments to meet the challenge.[5]

The migrant stream gives promise of a continued flow. Kingsley Davis, using a variety of means for estimating the number of migrants moving into cities of 100,000 population or more, suggested, for example, that the lowest probable figure for the quarter-century beginning in 1975 would be a little more than 37 millions, and that the highest estimate involved the movement of some 200 million Indians into cities of this size, from places outside.[6] Whether they are "pushed" by the meager material and psychological satisfactions to be obtained at home, or are "pulled" by the promise of employment (and greater social freedom) in the metropolis, the villagers are on the move. They seek--but do not always find--nonagricultural employment, and they constitute a potential industrial labor force.

This last fact is important, since it leads to the heart of one of the most controversial topics bearing upon the future of Indian cities. The four objectives of the Second Five Year Plan, according to a report published by the Planning Commission,[7] were: a sizable increase in national income; rapid industrialization; a large expansion in employment opportunities; and a reduction of inequalities in income and wealth. Clearly, the rapid expansion of industrial production has a special status among these goals, since it must be the chief instrument by which the others are achieved.[8] The industrial revolution, as it has been experienced so far in the developed countries of the world, has as its correlative a marked increase in the extent of urbanization. That is to say, as industrialization proceeds, an ever larger proportion of the population finds itself in towns and cities. A simple logical procedure would suggest that an increase in urbanization in India would

be associated with an increase in the national income, an expansion of job opportunities, and a decrease in the inequalities of income and wealth. In the present situation, therefore, it might seem reasonable to expect that the urban jobless population could serve as a stimulant to rapid industrialization, and that such industrial growth would draw new waves of job-seeking migrants to the cities.[9]

To proceed in this rather simple fashion, one might expect, then, that the Indian government would find it advantageous to devote a large share of the national resources to the cities, in the way of promoting the expansion of successful industries and encouraging new enterprises. Various incentives can be imagined, but a part of such encouragement and promotion might consist of the furnishing of the social overheads of metropolitan efficiency. Housing, medical and educational facilities, coherent community development, transportation--the industrial workers would require all of these, and their provision would, directly or indirectly, increase the productivity of labor.

Here we encounter a paradox. In fact, not only is there scarcely any support, in India, for the assignment of resource priorities to the cities, but exactly the opposite is found to be true. "The abysmal hunger in Calcutta for housing, sanitation, water supply, and road reparation will have to wait," wrote a Bengali correspondent to Richard L. Park.[10] "My own view," continues the same correspondent, "[is] that Calcutta is now paying the price of having prospered in the past by draining the life-blood from the countryside, both economically as well as in human resources. . . . For a long time action will have to be taken to redress the balance . . ." These are strong words, and probably few of the Indians attending the Seminar would express themselves with such bitterness. And yet, as Sachin Chaudhuri points out,[11] despite an ancient tradition of urbanism in India, there has been in recent centuries a powerful anti-city sentiment. In part this stems from the fact that the major cities in India today--Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, New Delhi, for example--had their origins as centers of colonial economic exploitation, and that they turned their faces away from their hinterlands and towards London. Gandhi was clearly troubled by this association, which no doubt explains his belief that industrial centralization "cannot be sustained and defended without adequate force."[12]

Surprising reinforcement of these views turns up in the Planning Commission itself. Thus we find the Commission

quoting, with approval, Gandhi's "prophetic" statement of 1916 to the effect that "India's salvation lies in the villages, with the Indian farmer."[13] Moreover, the Commission tells us, underlying those objectives of the Second Five Year Plan which we have already discussed are certain fundamental decisions, of which one is that India would first develop its agriculture and its rural people, and another is that the villagers would be "awakened," so that their energies might serve as a principal instrument of the development effort (but not that they might depart, awake, to the cities).[14] It appears, then, that the bias against big cities and a concentration of industry is built into the goal structure which the Plans are meant to subserve. On the one hand, as the draft outline of the Third Plan reiterates, "there is an overriding need to lay the foundations for rapid industrialization over the next 15 years, if long-term objectives in regard to national income and employment are to be achieved";[15] on the other hand, "India is now, and in the foreseeable future will remain, a predominantly agricultural nation . . . for many decades, even generations, rural people and rural society will characterize Indian culture and economy."[16]

Official India, it seems, aims to break the traditional link between large cities and the growth of modern industrial production methods; and it intends to secure rapid industrialization, while maintaining a predominantly rural society, chiefly by manipulating the location of industry. A significant amount of large industry in India is found in the public sector, and there it is reasonably easy for the Government to make and carry out locational decisions. In its dealings with private industry the Government must restrict itself to relatively mild positive and negative incentives, dedicated as it is to democratic methods and the promulgation of the maximum amount of freedom. Besides being limited by the relative ineffectiveness of the incentives at its disposal, it is inhibited to an even greater degree by the lack of agreement concerning what constitutes the proper manipulation of industrial location.

Centralization and concentration are fairly easily understood, and it is generally recognized that, if there is no interference, the projected migrations will in all probability take place and Calcutta and Bombay will strengthen their existing industrial supremacy.[17] A recent study of New York, in discussing the tendency of large central offices to congregate there, notes that

> The needs of the elite group in the central office of a large company are as variable and unpredictable as those of any "producer." From week to week, their interests vary from some esoteric provision of the Internal Revenue Code to the political situation in Cuba; from the effectiveness of spot television commercials to the efficacy of operations research; from the best place to build a factory to the best time to issue stock. Once again, it is uneconomical for such offices to staff themselves internally to deal with every such problem; the only feasible pattern is to draw upon specialists as the need arises. And the most efficient locational arrangement is one which permits the specialists and those they serve to be congregated at a common point.[18]

Assuredly, as India modernizes her productive system and begins to acquire more of the associated paraphernalia so familiar in the West, similar situations will arise in Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi.

What is concretely implied by "decentralization," the vaunted alternative to the otherwise inevitable "centralization," is far from agreed upon. Obvious questions arise. Does decentralization signify a movement out of the large cities on the part of population and industry already there? Or does it mean that future urban and industrial growth will be redirected to more suitable locations? And what, precisely, are more suitable locations? Are they to be chosen because of the social structure they promote? Or are they to be chosen strictly on a basis of alternative costs?

A number of answers have been given to these questions, indicating a variety of viewpoints. Thus, Shanti Tangri, who believes that the swollen populations of the great Indian cities spell political unrest and social instability and at the same time constitute a waste of resources, advocates reversing the flow of "human and material capital" which now streams from the rural to the urban sector: "Communist China is doing it by coercive measures. India has to do it by economic inducement and persuasion."[19] Tarlok Singh, joint secretary of the Planning Commission, speaks of the necessity for a balanced development of town and countryside. "Large sections of the population may not be able easily to retreat from the town," he argues, "but the situation is sufficiently fluid for them to move from a large city to a small or middle-sized town."[20] William Bredo and Britton Harris, pursuing somewhat similar lines of inquiry,[21] proceed more cautiously. Each seems to believe that there is a tendency in India to

underrate the value of metropolitan areas as nurseries of economic growth. Harris, for example, while agreeing that the metropolises place a heavy burden upon the total national resources available for development, argues that "the high proportion of jobs in government, railways, and organized commerce and industry is not, and probably never can be, duplicated in the rural areas. . . . To a very considerable extent, the price which must be paid for urban development is a price paid for conducting these activities at all in the Indian economy." (Emphasis supplied.)

Both Bredo and Harris proceed on the assumption that if decentralization is to proceed--in the sense that industry is to be promoted outside of the metropolitan areas--great care ought to be exercised in selecting nuclei that can be shown to possess a social and economic climate making for industrial viability. Bredo, therefore, warns against pushing industry too far into the rural areas, where the proportion of failures could be dangerously high, and urges research into the factors making for entrepreneurial success. Harris is of the opinion that cities of less than 200,000 population tend to be without many of the environmental factors which stimulate manufacturing growth, and suggests that carefully chosen cities of between 250,000 and one million persons might provide the best sites alternative to the cities now possessing a virtual industrial monopoly.[22]

Harris' suggestions are intended to ensure successful and rapid industrialization, and it is significant that they hardly provide for ruralizing industry; rather, they outline an alternative pattern of continued urban growth, one which would ultimately lead to a larger number of cities above the million mark. Richard L. Meier argues that a future consequence of policies diverting industry and population to medium-sized towns would be the spread of massive agglomerations of contiguous urbanization. His alternative[23] is to accept the inevitability of Indian cities of a size not previously seen in world history--e.g., some 80 million inhabitants for Madras by the year 2050. In this context, the problems of the immediate future would cluster around finding an efficient metropolitan design, one that would solve the social and physical problems of cities of this order. Planned megapolises, Meier argues, would be far preferable to the haphazard growth of conurbations. Meier's own solution to the design problem is the cellular megapolis, each cell taking the form of an "urban village."

Clearly, the whole problem of finding feasible means of decentralization is in need of clarification. It rarely occurs that a nation can decide its goals with a great deal of specificity without reference to the possibilities (and impossibilities) inherent in its status quo, and it seems at least possible that India will find some of its cherished goals to be mutually exclusive. In the present context it may be that a predominantly rural way of life on the one hand and a steadily rising national income on the other are not fully compatible. Perhaps an appropriate form of decentralization will help to mediate the desired balance of goals; almost certainly, the attempt to establish a wasteful industrial location pattern would jeopardize the whole planning endeavor. Planning policy must be experimental and flexible,[24] rather than monolithic, and it must count on rising urban populations. Quite possibly the details of the pattern can be creatively influenced, but, in the words of Asoka Mehta, socialist leader and Member of Parliament, "Even if someone wanted to stop the waves of migrants, he would soon discover with King Canute that it cannot be done. All that is possible is to devise wise countervailing policies. . . . Our policies have to be sociologically controlled, not ideally envisaged."[25]

NOTES

1. Between 1941 and 1951, the population resident in India's metropolitan areas increased by nearly two-thirds. (See International Urban Research, Kingslev Davis, editor, The World's Metropolitan Areas, Berkeley, 1959.) The proportion of the total national population to be found in these metropolitan areas increased by 44 per cent over the same period.

2. A detailed analysis of recent migrations is provided by Donald J. Bogue and K. C. Zachariah, "Migration and Urbanization in India."

3. Edward G. Echeverria, "Housing and Urban Services."

4. Marshall B. Clinard and B. Chatterjee, "An Experiment in Urban Community Development."

5. P. R. Nayak, "The Challenge of Urban Growth to Indian Local Government."

6. Kingsley Davis, "Urbanization in India: Past and Future."

7. The New India: Progress Through Democracy, Planning Commission, Government of India, New York, 1958, p. 43.

8. This is not strictly true of the goal to reduce inequalities, but no doubt the real intention is to give more nearly equal shares of a larger pie; and the general experience has been that industrialization does lead to lessened inequality.

9. The nexus between urbanization and industrialization is not completely understood, and some might argue that the connection is accidental. Both Kingsley Davis (loc. cit.) and Bert Hoselitz, however, give grounds for thinking that India cannot have the one without the other. Bert F. Hoselitz, "The Role of Urbanization in Economic Development."

10. Richard L. Park, "The Urban Challenge to Local and State Government: West Calcutta."

11. Sachin Chaudhuri, "Centralization versus Alternate Forms of Decentralization--A Key Issue?"

12. Krishnalal Shridharani, The Mahatma and the World, New York, 1946, p. 229.

13. Planning Commission, op. cit., p. 43. This report has as its frontispiece, incidentally, a portrait of Gandhi.

14. Ibid., p. 60.

15. The Third Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline, Planning Commission, Government of India, June 1960, p. 204.

16. The New India: Progress Through Democracy, cited, p. 42.

17. William Bredo and Richard Ellefsen have attempted to measure this ascendancy. Their figures show that the combined metropolitan areas of Bombay and Calcutta have 40 per cent of the total number of all industrial plants in India.

18. Raymond Vernon, Metropolis: 1985, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 81.

19. Shanti Tangri, "Urbanization, Political Stability and Economic Growth."

20. Tarlok Singh, "Problems of Integrating Rural, Industrial, and Urban Development."

21. William Bredo, "Industrial Decentralization in India"; Britton Harris, "Urban Centralization and Planned Development."

22. It seems likely that, if only because of lower land costs, the provision of urban overheads would be considerably cheaper in such medium-sized towns than in the largest cities. Moreover, the medium cities may be expected to have the rudiments

of the required facilities, unlike the smallest towns. The whole question of comparative costs is exploited by Catherine Bauer Wurster in a chapter entitled "City Size and Social Overhead Costs."

23. Richard L. Meier, "Technology and the Design of Large Cities."

24. Albert Mayer, "Operational Problems of Urban Planning."

25. Asoka Mehta, "The Future of Indian Cities: National Issues and Goals."

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THE BURMA - CHINA BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT

Maung Maung

ON JANUARY 4th of this year Burma celebrated its thirteenth anniversary of independence. In Rangoon to take part in the rejoicing was Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, along with more than 400 members of a Chinese "cultural" delegation. As a token of eternal friendship and "pauk-phaw" (brotherly) feeling, he had brought with him the instrument of ratification of the Burma-China Boundary Treaty, which he and Burma's Premier U Nu had signed in Peking on an equally auspicious day--for China--October 1, 1960. Gifts, too, were exchanged: 2,000 tons of rice and 1,000 tons of salt from Burma for the approximately one million Chinese residing on China's side of the border; 2.4 million metres of printed textiles and 600,000 pieces of porcelain plates from China for the nearly one million Burmese living along Burma's side of the border.[1] Kind words and compliments were passed and re-dedications were offered to the five principles of peaceful co-existence.

The treaty, Mr. Chou En-lai had said on October 1, laid to rest a problem "inherited from history, a product of imperialist policies of aggression," and finally demarcated "a boundary of peace and friendship" along 2,000 kilometres; it was thus a "brilliant model" for peaceful co-existence among Asian peoples. U Nu, responding warmly, had emphasised that the agreement was a friendly one, entered into freely and on terms of "absolute equality." It would be "ridiculous," U Nu said, to suggest that the treaty had been imposed on China by Burma or on Burma, whose peoples have a strong "will and determination to be free," by China.[2]

The border problem, which has now been peaceably and, Burma hopes, permanently settled, was one that had defied solution for some three-quarters of a century. When the British annexed upper Burma in 1885, their anxiety to win the goodwill and recognition of their new neighbour led them to sign a convention obligating them to send "decennial missions to present articles of local produce," in return for which China agreed to allow England "to do whatever she deems fit and proper in Burma."[3] The British, however, quickly came to

realize that the Burmese never had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, that missions bearing gifts and daughters were exchanged mutually and not as a one-way traffic, and that, although in the wars and invasions of history the Chinese had sometimes been able to overwhelm by force of numbers, the Burmese had more often been able to repel the hordes and had consistently upheld the integrity of their kingdom and their traditional frontiers.

After the British had established their power over Burma, therefore, they conveniently forgot to send the decennial missions, and instead tried to consolidate their position and to demarcate the borders with China. A convention was signed on March 1, 1894, to this purpose, and a supplementary agreement on February 4, 1897. There was a joint survey in 1905 of a disputed area, and there were exchanges of notes, skirmishes, occupations and protests, and negotiations involving Britain and France, China and Tibet and Burma. The convention signed by Britain and China on April 27, 1906, in the course of the negotiations expressed the understanding of "the high contracting parties that Thibet forms part of Chinese territory." Great stakes were thus involved, and the fortunes of many peoples.

Further notes were exchanged in 1914 between the British plenipotentiary, Sir Henry McMahon, and the Tibetan authorities regarding the India-Tibet boundary between the Isu Razi pass on the Salween-Irawaddy divide on the east and Bhutan on the west. Another and more extensive joint survey of the Burma-China border was undertaken in 1937 under the leadership of a neutral chairman appointed by the League of Nations, and the notes exchanged in July 1941 between the British and the Chinese authorities embodied some of the findings and recommendations of the survey commission.[4]

The Nationalist Government of China after World War II, and the Communist Government after its takeover, continued to publish maps of China showing large parts of northern Burma as Chinese: it was as if the northern triangle of Burma were part of the bulging belly of a large dragon sprawled lazily over a caving-in roof. The government of Burma protested whenever the maps came to its notice, and the Chinese government would reply that the border could be demarcated at some future time in a friendly spirit. The tides of change that swept China and Burma in the post-war years also pushed the border problem into the background, and except for the occasional maps and protests and routine replies, the problem lay dormant.

A joint communiqué issued by U Nu and Chou En-lai at the end of the former's visit to Peking in December 1954 referred to the "incomplete delimitation of the boundary line" and acknowledged the necessity "to settle this question in a friendly spirit at an appropriate time through normal diplomatic channels." A skirmish between Burmese armed forces on a flag march in the Wa state and wandering Chinese troops occurred, however, in November 1955, and the story found its way, via different channels and official discretion, onto the front page of The Nation, a Rangoon newspaper, early in 1956, whereupon charges of "invasion" were taken up by other newspapers throughout the country. The border problem having thus assumed urgency and importance, negotiations for an early and final settlement were started in earnest at the highest levels of the two governments.

The Chinese stand at first was that the "1941 line" had been imposed on them by the British at a time when China had been distracted by Japanese aggression and internal warfare, and that therefore the "agreement" was void. A revision of the entire "1941 line" was called for, with both sides undertaking to maintain the status quo pending a final settlement. The Chinese also wanted the return of three villages--Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum--in the Kachin state of Burma which they considered to be rightfully theirs, because the British had seized them over Chinese protests and, in notes of 1911, had offered to pay China an annual rental for their occupation, thereby acknowledging Chinese ownership. The British had also taken a "perpetual lease" from China of the Namwan Assigned Tract in return for an annual rental of 1,000 rupees or 200 dollars; the Chinese had refused to accept the rent after 1948, when Burma became independent, and now they demanded that the lease be abrogated. In view of the fact that an important Burmese highway passed through the Namwan Tract, China offered to trade it for a comparable area in the Wa territory of the Shan state in Burma.

The Burmese bargained for the status quo as they had inherited it from the British: viz., the "1941 line and the traditional borders," the three Kachin villages, and the Namwan Tract as a free gift. Later, U Nu on a visit to Peking in November 1956, became convinced of the justness of China's claim to the three villages, and he promised Chou En-lai that he would fully support the return of the villages: "Burma must act on moral reasons; she must not retain what she does not own." The Kachin leaders whom he had brought to Peking to participate in the discussions were not, however, so deeply

moved by moral considerations, and refused to commit themselves.

Thus the negotiations continued over the years, sometimes in personal discussions between U Nu or Deputy Premiers U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein on the one hand and Chou En-lai on the other, in Peking or Rangoon, Kunming or Mashi, and sometimes in spastic correspondence. Meanwhile in Burma many political changes were taking place. In 1956 U Nu went to Peking as president of the united Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), while U Ba Swe became premier. In 1957 U Nu returned to office, and U Ba Swe resumed his former deputy's role. In April 1958 the AFPFL, which had held power for a decade, broke in two, and U Nu and U Ba Swe found themselves facing each other, not as colleagues across the table in the Cabinet room, but as leaders of rival factions contending for power. In October 1958, U Nu stepped down from office, after having held it for a few anxious months with the support of his faction, and moved in Parliament for the election of General Ne Win, the Chief of Staff, as leader of a "caretaker government" that should be entrusted with the tasks of restoring law and order and holding fair and free elections.

The negotiations on the border problem continued during these changes, fitfully as more urgent matters occupied the domestic scene, but with the two AFPFL factions in agreement on the broad issues. U Nu was able to persuade the Kachin leaders to agree to the return of the three villages, and General Ne Win won the cooperation of the Kachin and Shan leaders in working for a final settlement. Meanwhile the border dispute between India and China placed the Burma-China border in a new perspective and may have sharpened China's desire to demarcate it amicably and thus hold up a "brilliant model" for all to see.

Towards the end of 1959, as his departure from political office drew near, General Ne Win made forthright and soldierly proposals to Mr. Chou, not failing to point out that, as leader of the interim government, he commanded the support of all the major parties in Burma as an elected party government might not be able to do. He offered to go to Peking if there was a prospect of prompt and full agreement. Receiving a prompt and heartening response, he flew to Peking and on January 28, 1960, signed two agreements, one embodying the settlement in principle of the border problem, and the other pledging peace and friendship between the two countries.

The Ne Win-Chou Agreement accepted the "1941 line" and the traditional border in the north marked naturally by the watershed; returned the three Kachin villages to China; abrogated the perpetual lease on the Namwan Tract and transferred the Tract to Burma in exchange for an area in the Wa territory of the Shan state; and provided for the working out of the details of demarcation by a joint commission and for the signing and ratification of a treaty to replace the earlier conventions, agreements and notes between the British and Chinese. U Nu, having returned to the premiership on a huge wave of popularity, took up the border question as a matter of first importance. He piloted the Agreement through Parliament and won approval for its ratification on April 28, 1960. Formal instruments were exchanged on May 14.

The joint survey commission, under the leadership of Brigadier Aung Gyi, Vice-Chief of Staff, on the Burmese side, became extremely active, holding sessions in Rangoon, Kunming and Peking by turns, while field teams worked in the wild mountain areas, even during the rains, marking points on the border and putting up stones. By September the commission had completed enough of its work to formulate the details to be incorporated in the treaty. On October 1 the treaty was signed in Peking, whither U Nu had gone with a large delegation of government, political and cultural leaders.

The Treaty, implementing the Ne Win-Chou Agreement in detail, effects the following transfers of territory: Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kanfang, comprising 59 square miles as against the 180 previously claimed, are returned to China; an area of 73 square miles claimed by China, under the Panglao and Panghung tribes of the Shan state, are transferred to China in return for the 85-square-mile Namwan Assigned Tract. The survey commission had found that the "1941 line" passed through certain villages, and, because it would be undesirable for a village to be administered in part by China and in part by Burma, had recommended fair sharing and exchanges. This recommendation was accepted in the Treaty: two villages passed under Chinese control, and four under Burmese. China also renounced its right of participation in mining enterprises at Lufang in Burma, as provided in the notes exchanged with the British in 1941, such renunciation being "in line with its consistent policy of opposing foreign prerogatives and respecting the sovereignty of other countries"; the Burmese government undertook to operate the mines without foreign assistance. Where the boundary follows a river, the Treaty accepts the international practice of demarcation. In the

event of any dispute arising over the delimited boundary, the parties agree to settle it in friendly consultation.

Burma, in urgent need of consolidation after the civil strife and political upheavals that followed independence, is relieved that a problem, and a potential source of danger, has been removed at least for the present. The long untamed border with China has held many threats to Burma in the forms of, among others, Communist Chinese troops, Kuomintang troops, illegal immigration, and hostile propaganda. Burmese Communist insurgents, in arms against the government now for more than 12 years, have tried unsuccessfully to build a stronghold with Yunnan as a base. The border region also represents a challenge and a promise: it has the potentials for economic, cultural and social development. Moreover, if co-existence with China along the border is to be friendly, it will also be highly competitive. There must therefore be a sustained effort to give the border peoples a better and more rewarding existence. The Treaty does not end all of the border problems or the other problems involved in Burma's relations with its big neighbour. It does, however, free the leaders of public life in Burma to work for national unity, strength and progress, without which the country must remain weak and exposed, treaties notwithstanding. Their present behaviour suggests that these leaders are sharply aware of both the need and the opportunity.

NOTES

1. Speech by U Nu in the Chamber of Deputies, December 5, 1960, seeking approval of ratification of the Treaty. Burma Weekly Bulletin, December 15, 1960.

2. The speeches are reproduced in the Burma Weekly Bulletin, October 13, 1960, as is the text of the Boundary Treaty.

3. Command Paper presented to Parliament in August 1887, London, HMSO.

4. Treaty Series No. 48 (1956), presented to Parliament by command, December 1956, London, HMSO.

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MISSIONARIES AMONG THE HILL TRIBES OF BURMA

Charles S. Brant and Mi Mi Khaing

THE activities of Christian missionaries in Burma have long been a controversial subject for the Buddhist intelligentsia, lay and clerical, of that country. These have had a prejudice, vague but fairly strong, against the work of the missionaries; yet, being for the most part tolerant, they have shrunk from expressing this prejudice freely. For one glance has shown them that together with evangelical activities the Christian missionaries have established schools, dispensaries and orderly village communities, providing such amenities as gifts of books, clothing and scholarships for their converts. Therefore, the rational response of the Buddhist to his prejudice has been to question the rightness of depriving the hill peoples of such benefits simply because it has been the Christian missionaries who offered them. Further, Buddhists have tended to doubt that there could be anything fundamentally wrong about men and women who, although teaching a creed alien to Buddhist thought, devoted their lives to good works among foreign peoples.

From a different point of view, that of the social scientist (and particularly, of the cultural anthropologist), the interaction of missionaries with the hill peoples of Burma, and its results, provide the opportunity for an informative study in cultural change. Our purpose is to analyze the impact of missionary activities in Burma as a case study in social processes developing from the introduction of a certain set of beliefs and customs into settings radically different from those of their source.

Missionaries have tended to operate far more actively and in much greater numbers among the hill peoples than among the valley peoples in Burma. Although there are missionary settlements among the Burmese and the Shans, these are negligible in proportion to the population of the groups concerned and compared to the number among the hill peoples.

The hill peoples have been regarded as a rich field for missionary activity. Unlike the Mons, Burmese and Arakanese

under their Buddhist kings or the Shans under their chiefs, these tribes, when Western influences first came to this part of Asia, lacked a stable, central administrative authority. Under the political systems in the valleys, there had developed a comparatively complex and variegated culture, impregnated by Buddhism and characterized by a deep-rooted religio-social structure. Kingship or chieftainship was inextricably bound up with religion, not so much because the source of authority was considered divine as because these peoples did not yet understand the secularization of any important function.

The hill tribes lacked this unifying influence of intertwined religion, culture and administration. Although many tribes are classified as Buddhist, their Buddhism is very strongly underlaid with their own local customs, beliefs and traditions. Hence the term animist is frequently applied to many of these peoples. Put simply, their animism is a response to a desire to ward off evil, invoke good, and experience the exaltation of being one with the unknown and non-material. This desire is particularly strong among hill peoples who are undistracted by the sophistication of town life. It is this desire which Buddhism has ignored and which Christian missionaries have perceived and served.

One reason for the lack of interest on the part of Buddhism is that under British rule there was an interdict on Buddhist activity in the hill country known as the "scheduled areas." Another reason is the relatively unassertive nature of Buddhism: philosophy that is not dogmatic, that wishes to live and let live, is likely to be non-proselytizing when left to its own devices.

If the Buddhist majority is so tolerant, why then should it object to the activities of Christian missionaries among peoples it has so far ignored? The answer is that, in the forms and contexts in which it is offered to converts, perceptive Buddhists see two elements in Christianity. One is the spiritual message of Jesus; the other is the administrative and organizing authority behind those churches that are sufficiently powerful to endow missionary programs.

Christian churches, all of which believe in one, true, omnipotent Creator-God, in the divinity of Christ, and in His crucifixion as a loving sacrifice in atonement for human sins, make so much of their differences in ritual and non-fundamental doctrines that they have made a church into an organization

controlled, financed and attended exclusively by those who subscribe to its particular creed. The adherents of such an organization are said to belong to their church and they belong to no other; indeed, if they are fervent supporters of their church, they will not, if they can avoid it, have contact with another. All of this seems very strange to Burmese Buddhists, who embrace as brothers their co-religionists in Tibet, China and Japan, despite the fact that the Buddhism practiced in those countries differs from the Burmese type far more than a dozen Christian denominations differ from one another. Moreover, Burmese Buddhists can contribute to and worship in pagodas erected by foreign Buddhists without feeling any sense of unorthodoxy.

For a Christian church, thus conceived, to be most successful, it must number more adherents than other churches. So it is that in the mission field the churches come to operate, as it were, in rivalry with one another. "The thirst for Christian education," noted a prominent missionary to Burma, "having grown to such an extent among the Eastern Karens . . . many had determined to secure this from any who would give it to them. Hence their appeal . . . for a permanent teacher. If the Missionary Union would send this help they were content. Otherwise they would apply to other missionary bodies. This meant the Ritualists with all their evils."[1] He urged the authorities of his mission body in the United States to send a missionary. The "heathen" Karens, it may be noted, did not perceive the fine distinction between Christian and Christian.

In effect, when Christianity is offered to its converts in Burma, the pastor and the particular source of authority behind him, the church, become as important as the doctrine and, indeed, inseparable from the doctrine. Consciously or not, this attitude is ingrained in the missionary himself. Observation among converted hill peoples leaves no doubt that these folk identify the Christian religion with their particular church.

Although there is no intention here, of course, to single out any one missionary group as exclusively affecting its adherents in the way described, it is true that Protestant pastors as a whole, unlike Roman Catholic priests and nuns, marry, have families, maintain contact with their home countries, and in short do not renounce the world. This makes a difference in how they are regarded by those among whom they work. Roman Catholic missionaries, drawn from several coun-

tries, receive the sort of veneration accorded Buddhist monks, whereas the Protestants, each of whose sects is usually staffed by a single nationality--and especially when imbued with the American "drive" and emphasis upon success in terms of tangible results--enjoy the prestige and authority of local chieftains.

There is, moreover, the particular outlook of the hill tribes to be considered: the impulsive fervor, the zeal and passion for a new idea. These people are taught that there is but one true God as revealed to a particular sect, and that to be considered His worshipper one must be enrolled as such in a particular manner in a particular organization, others being wrong, wicked and beyond redemption. This is not to say that such ideas convey the essence of Christianity or even represent what the pastor himself believes. Indeed, the ordinary Western Christian sees his religion in the light of generations of Christian forefathers; he accepts the doctrine calmly, either taking his faith for granted or regarding it as a satisfactory vehicle for religious expression. The Burmese, Chinese or Japanese convert also has a cultural background against which to place the new doctrine.

But when this doctrine is taught to the hill peoples, it elicits a different response. Here is an idea they can grasp at once: My God is right and yours is wrong. The American Baptist Lahus and the Roman Catholic Kaws formerly chanted this phrase at each other until, with the advent of the Japanese occupation in 1942 and the evacuation of American pastors while Italian priests remained, the Kaws were to be heard shrieking those words in triumphant vindication of their claim. The same missionary quoted earlier, who worked for many years among the Karens, stated: "In the thought of the more intelligent natives of the East, where the Gospel of Christ has been proclaimed, mankind is composed only of two classes, heathen and Christian, the former rejecting Christ and His Gospel while the latter humbly accept both."[2] The dangers inherent in encouraging bands of converts to entertain this invidious distinction, while surrounded on all sides by men who have "rejected Christ and His Gospel," should be obvious, for even in more advanced stages of cultural evolution men have fought for their gods.

The Burma missionary works in a small, well-defined field, unavoidably at first, perhaps, because the hill tribes have different languages and dialects and the new missionary can learn but one language at a time and thus prefers to

confine his activity to one group. But even after long residence, during which diverse peoples could be gathered under one roof, this separateness persists. One consequence is partisanship, applied to strictly demarcated spheres of activity. Take, as an illustration, the tribes around Loimwe, a hill station nineteen miles from Kengtung, capital of the largest of the Shan States. Though the Kaws and Lahus, who live on neighboring slopes, traverse the same area in their daily travels, the American Baptist Mission confines its activities to Lahus and the Roman Catholic to Kaws--neither mission being interested in the Shans, who are the majority. Not only are the differences between Kaws and Lahus thus perpetuated, but both are differentiated from the Shan majority, which rules the state.

In the Shan States, where the British imposed indirect rule and preserved the system of state chieftains, the administration, like that of the Burmese kings, is still Buddhist in its procedures. The village headmen and their followers, for example, who come from distant valleys on foot to pay taxes, report and confer with the chieftain, do so on the four religious festivals of the year. Thus the religious ceremonies are inextricably bound up, in their minds and in practice, with the paying of homage to the central ruler, with the duties of each village to the capital, and with social gatherings in the company of their countrymen from distant villages which they can never expect to visit. And, as is the case with Buddhists, the first, last and most ubiquitous ceremony in these socio-political-religious activities is the prostration of oneself before ruler, monks, and elders, with hands folded as in prayer, and the receiving of blessings in return. When any of these practices, parts of an integral whole, is forbidden to the converts of a Christian sect, not only will that sect be deprived of much social activity, but it will gradually be alienated from the central authority as well. It appears unrealistic to expect a people to distinguish between what is to be rendered unto Caesar and what unto God unless such differentiation is a part of their culture. Where religion plays so large a part in the culture of a people, religious allegiance tends to be all of their allegiance.

Concerning the interference of conversion with local customs, Bunker wrote:

> There have been, and of necessity always will be, two distinct features of missionary work as viewed from a material or a spiritual standpoint. The root principle of all such

> work is of Divine origin. It has its birth and rise in the heart and work of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Being Divine, it cannot be subjected to human rules and reasoning. Nor can it be understood in its working by those who do not thus receive it. Hence we claim that all reasoning about the "Naturalization of Religion" to certain races, or its adaptation to the thought and customs of different nations, is contrary to the very genius of Christianity.[3]

Accordingly, the Christian missionary in Burma, claiming divine authority for his actions, has tried to enforce the man-made dicta of his particular organization by, for example, forbidding the drinking of zoo among the Chins, whose indulgence in this intoxicating beverage is regarded in their culture as necessary on certain occasions when their economic system calls for the ritual apportioning of food and drink, and by characterizing as worship the customary respect which Buddhists in Burma pay to parents, monks, teachers and elders, and extend to their national leaders.

Such exclusion of local traditions from the life of a people already different from their neighbors in language and culture leads unavoidably to two results. One is the knitting together of the converts into a tight group, living model lives--clean, industrious, cooperative and obedient to their pastor. The other is the development of an awareness, both within the sect and among the surrounding unconverted majority, of the group as differentiated, alien and potentially hostile.

The missionary effort among the Karens fostered the ideal of Karen nationality and taught this people to feel group pride and dignity. It assured them that under the then prevailing British law they had equal rights with other peoples. But the sequel was that there arose a group of sectarian Karen zealots who eventually, in 1948, led many of their people into futile armed rebellion against the newly independent government of Burma rather than compromise what was, on any showing, a ridiculously exorbitant and unworkable set of demands for a Karen State.

Much earlier, at the time that the nineteenth-century British pacification of Burma had seemed a well-nigh impossible task because of the guerrilla tactics of bands of Burmese, these settlements of Christian converts had been armed by a reluctant civil authority on the insistence of the missionaries and had been used effectively to subdue the guerrillas. Missionaries commented with pride on the results,

which had greatly exceeded the expectations of the administrators, in terms of the "unifying power of Christianity."

That the process of conversion since then has followed the same trend may be gathered from the remark of a former missionary to the effect that if there is one thing the missionaries have not done, it is to teach their converts that they are all Burmans, that is, citizens of Burma.[4] More recently still, the converted Lahus in Kengtung have shown tendencies similar to those of the Karens mentioned above.

One result, therefore, of missionary activity has been that inter-tribal differences, which existed among the hill peoples in past centuries because of the lack of communications, commerce and a central authority that could provide a common education and government, have been perpetuated in a period when unification was possible. These peoples have tended to form small "nations" incapable of supporting themselves above subsistence level. Missionaries, with their typically Western predilection for championing the underdog, believe that they are protecting these groups from Burmese exploitation. But such protection ensures the nurture of these Christianized groups in a culture and philosophy alien to those around them. The time may come when, with the withdrawal of the protecting influence, these peoples will feel insecure, resented and resentful. This was the Karens' fate, and it could befall others.

Such are the dynamics of the situation as viewed by the social scientist. Many thoughtful Burmans have also pondered these problems and suggested solutions. The more tolerant have rejected the frequently advocated radical action of banishing foreign missions and of thus inhibiting the teaching of one of the world's great religions. Instead, they have made two appeals. To the Buddhists of the rich valleys of Burma who spend considerable sums on local religious works they have proposed the sponsorship of monasteries, small schools and health centers in the hill areas. This program has been conceived not merely as competition with the Christian missions but as a means of providing the hill peoples with opportunities to develop in a cultural environment that will gradually bring them into communication and participation with the vast majority of the nation's people.

The second appeal on the part of the Burman intelligentsia has been directed to those who propagate Christianity. These have been asked to consider the difficulties of a new nation of diverse peoples and cultures striving for unity;

to extend their work to many groups instead of concentrating on one; and to teach their converts the overriding importance of a neighborly attitude towards their non-Christian fellows. The leaders of Christianity in Burma have been asked, in essence, to imbue the hill peoples with a greater measure of tolerance, such as that which, for example, causes Krishna to assure Arjuna in the Bhagavad-Gita: "Even those who, contrary to the scriptures, worship alien gods are, provided they do so with faith, in reality worshipping me." However, since they live in a Buddhist land, they might well amend the latter phrase to read, in keeping with The Buddha's teaching, "in reality treading a right and noble path."

Notes

1. Alonzo Bunker, Sketches from the Karen Hills, New York, 1910, 40.

2. Ibid., 60-61.

3. Ibid., 132.

4. Gordon S. Seagrave, Burma Surgeon Returns, New York, 1946, 268.

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